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Failure of a Twenty-Foot High Retaining Wall 
R. E. Olson 
L. P. Gilvin Professor of Civil Engineering, University of Texas, 
Austin, Texas 
SYNOPSIS A cantilever retaining wall, designed in apparent accord with provisions in a civil engineering handbook, 
failed soon after construction. Analyses of the causes of the failure are presented. 
INTRODUCTION 
Cantilever retaining walls are typically designed using 
either the Rankine or Coulomb equations to estimate 
applied forces and considering failure modes involving 
sliding, overturning, toe failures, and overall failure. The 
standard design techniques are in civil engineering 
handbooks and have been in use for decades. Designers 
would seem to have the right to expect that a wall designed 
in accord with handbooks would perform adequately well. 
A cantilever retaining wall with a maximum height 
exceeding twenty-six feet (eight metres) was designed by a 
registered professional engineer, in accord with a standard 
handbook. The designer was a generalist who performed 
design work in most areas of civil engineering and was thus 
not trained specially in geotechnical engineering. The 
designer used factors of safety in excess of two against the 
usual failure modes. The wall collapsed and subsequent 
litigation led to losses in excess of $1 million for the 
designer. 
The purpose of this paper is to present the case history, 
examine the original design calculations, present a more 
appropriate, but still simple, set of analyses, and draw 
relevant conclusions. 
CASE IDSTORIES OF RETAINING WALL FAILURES 
Anecdotal evidence of unacceptable performance of 
retaining walls, can be heard but well-defined case histories 
seem to be few. Ireland (1964) made a survey of walls 
used to support railway cuts. He categorized the backfill 
and subsoil simply as "sand" (including gravel) and "clay". 
The distribution of data for walls that had not performed 
properly are shown in Table 1. 
These cases confirm the general view that the major 
problems are associated with cohesive soils. 
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Table 1 Summary of Cases of Retaining Walls 
Engaging in Unacceptable Behavior 
(Ireland, 1964) 
Subsoil Backfill % of Walls 
clay clay 43 
clay sand 17 
clay unknown 8 
sand clay 8 
unknown unknown 24 
sand sand 0 
DEVELOPMENT OF SITE 
A developer selected a site in Central Texas for a shopping 
center. The site fronted on a major street and was 
generally flat until near the back edge and left side where 
the surface began to slope downwards into a large tract of 
land that was left wild and used as a nature preserve. The 
ground in the preserve sloped down at about 15 to 20 
degrees. 
Economic considerations dictated a certain floor area 
for the shopping center, and city ordinances then required a 
certain area for parking spaces and driveways. It was 
discovered that it would be necessary to provide parking 
and driveways to a line near the edges of the property and 
thus that it would be necessary to use a 1300-foot (400-m) 
long retaining wall along the left side and the rear, to 
support fill. The maximum height of the actual wall, 
measured from the top of the stem to the bottom of the 
keyway, was 26 feet 9 inches (8.2 m). 
City environmentalists objected to the presence of a high 
concrete wall at the upper edge of the nature preserve so a 
solution was worked out such that there would be a 
relatively low single wall over much of the length and a 
double wall (Fig. 1) over a 700-foot (210-m) section where 
the wall was higher than about fifteen feet (4.6 m). 
Vegetation below the lower wall would obscure that wall 
from view from below, and vegetation in the flat area 
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Fig. 1 Wall Configuration in the Area of the Failure 
between the walls and above the top wall would obscure the 
upper wall and shopping center. An irrigation system was 
planned at the top and at the mid-height. 
SITE INVESTIGATION AT DESIGN TIME 
About thirty soil borings were made at the site as part of 
several engineering studies. However, discussion in the 
engineering reports was restricted to the buildings and to 
pavements. The wall may not have been contemplated 
during the main design time. The boring closest to the wall 
was one-hundred feet (30m) away. Over much of the site 
there was one to four feet (1 to 1.2 m) of rocky clay on top 
of limestone. Several borings penetrated the limestone and 
encountered a layer of clay shale at a depth of fifteen to 
twenty feet (4.5 to 6 m). The limestone layer was missing 
over part of the site, with the clay shale exposed. The clay 
shale was also exposed in the slope behind the structure and 
that slope was probably at the angle of repose. No water 
table was encountered in any soil boring. 
The boring closest to the wall showed a soil profile of 
four feet (1.2 m) of clay over limestone with the limestone 
described as weathered near its surface but very hard at a 
depth of six feet (1.8 m). 
In accord with usual practice, most of the soil tests were 
of the classification type. Atterberg limit tests indicated 
that most the the cohesive soil had liquid limits in the range 
of 30 to 50% and plasticity points plotted above the- A line. 
Unconfined compressive strengths of shallow clays were 
generally 1 to 3 tsf (100-300 kPa), with strengths up to 7 
tsf (700 kPa) at greater depths in fissured clay shale. 
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DESIGN OF THE WALL 
In view of the fact that subsurface materials were generally 
limestone or stiff to hard clay shale, that there was an 
interest in getting the project in operation quickly, and the 
wall may have been a late addition to the design, the 
designer apparently saw little need to perform expensive 
soil tests. The designer attempted to follow 
recommendations in the Standard Handbook for Civil 
Engineers (Merritt, 1983), literally tracking through each 
successive calculation using the same symbols as in the 
handbook. The designer selected an apparently 
conservative active earth pressure coefficient of 0.4 (cp-25 
degrees) and a total unit weight of 100 pcf for the backfill. 
The factor of safety against overturning was calculated 
as the ratio of the potential resisting moment to the 
apparent overturning moment, about the toe. The designer 
analyzed the two wall sections separately and ignored the 
effect of the upper wall on the lower one. The calculated 
factor of safety of the lower wall was 2.4. 
For the sliding mode of failure, a wall-surface friction 
coefficient of 0.62 was used (o-32 deg.), and the factors of 
safety defined using forces, were inexplicably around 1.0. 
The designer estimated the toe stress by taking moments 
about the heel. In consideration of the presence of 
limestone and clay shale, the designer set a limit on the 
calculated toe stress of 5000 psf (240 kPa) based on an 
undefined handbook and a description of the soil as "clay 
shale". The actual calculated toe stress was 4.3 ksf (206 
kPa). 
No slope stability type analyses were performed tc 
examine the possibility of an overall failure. 
The designer specified that 2-inch (50-mm) diamete1 
PVC drainage tubes be cast into both the upper and lowe1 
walls, near the base of their stems, on 20-foot (6-m: 
centers. A one-cubic foot (0.03 cu.m.) bag of clean 3/4· 
inch (18-mm) gravel was to be placed on the soil side o: 
each drainage hole to provide filtration. 
No specifications were provided for the backfill but i 
was believed that local practice, and city specifications we~ 
followed. The city specifications set no limit on th~ 
maximum particle size but specified that "The percentage o 
fines shall be sufficient to fill all voids and insure a uniforn 
and thor?ughly compacted mass of proper density" 
ConstructiOn records show that several density tests wer 
performed. The backfill apparently ranged from tar. 
weathered, limestone gravel, to a brown gravelly cla) 
Field density tests indicated 95% to 100% of standar 
Proctor compaction. 
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BEHAVIOR OF THEW ALL 
Construction History 
Construction records were not entirely available but it is 
known that backfilling of the wall occurred during April 
and it is believed that the wall was completely backfilled in 
May. 
Wall Failure 
In late July, after a period of heavy rain, a section of the 
lower rear wall, with. a length of about 135 feet ( 41 m), 
~uddenl.Y began to dtsplace horizontally. My first site 
mspectton was about seven hours after the failure 
apparently began and, at that point, the lower wall had 
displace~ horiz?ntally about fifteen feet (5 m) (Fig. 2). A 
substantial verttcal scarp had formed in the fill because the 
upper wall had dropped into the void formed when the 
lower wall displaced. The lower wall continued to displace 
horizontally at a slow rate. Some months later, when the 
wall approached the property line, the damaged portion of 
the wall was removed. 
Fig. 2 View of the Failed Section of Wall 
Site Observations 
The exposed fill was mostly limestone gravel but there 
were several layers of clay. Water was leaking out of the 
most pervious layers in the ftll. 
Vegetation in front of the lower wall was dry and dead 
but vegetation that had been between or above the walls was 
green. The soil directly in front of the wall, and the 
slumped fill, was soft. Broken irrigation pipes could be 
seen in the fill between and above the walls. 
Based on the lack of stains, many of the weep holes had 
apparently not functioned. Attempts to drive rods through 
them often failed. It appeared that the fill side of some of 
the holes was blocked with concrete. Water was spurting 
out of the top part of one of the weep holes, in a stream 
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with a diameter about the size of a pencil. Apparently, the 
back side of the weep hole was blocked except for one small 
hole, and there must have been a substantial water head 
behind the wall. 
Examination of intact portions of the wall showed the 
presence of rust stains along vertical joints, to a height of 
about six feet (two metres) above toe slab of the lower wall. 
POST -FAILURE SOILS INVESTIGATION 
Post failure site access was difficult because of the debris. 
w.e made two borings, using a light, portable rig, about 
thtrty feet outside the original position of the lower wall 
and one in the fill just behind the scarp. 
One boring in front of the wall encountered four feet 
(1.2 m) of medium to stiff black clay, grading rocky near 
the bottom, and met refusal at four feet (1.2 m), probably 
due to limestone. The other boring encountered four feet 
(1.2 m) of soft, wet, rocky clay (probably fill), over three 
feet (1.0 m) of tan clay (LL=54%, Pl=33%, w=31 %), and 
then refusal. The third boring was in the fill · that had not 
yet failed. It encountered four feet (1.2 m) of pavement, 
base, and a rocky clay; two feet (0.6 m) of dry granular 
fill; 3.5 feet 1.1 m) of soft, wet, gravelly clay (LL=30%, 
Pl=13%, w=22%); one foot (0.3 m) of very soft tan clay; 
five feet (1.5 m) of very soft, wet, gravelly clay (LL=28%, 
Pl=ll %, w=35%), two feet (0.6 m) of medium tan clay, 
and four feet (1.2 m) of dry, medium to stiff, black clay. 
~is boring confirmed the heterogeneous nature of the fill. 
The fact that an essentially vertical scarp, with a height 
of about six feet (2 m), stood for some days after the 
failure, seemed to indicate that the fill was reasonably well 
compacted. 
Because of the heterogeneous nature of the fill, we did 
not perform any shearing tests on fill material. We 
performed four drained direct shear tests on samples of 
natural clay taken from a depth of four to six feet (1.2-2.0 
m) in one of the borings in front of the wall (Fig. 3). 
·~ 7r---------~----------~------~~ 
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Results of Direct Shear Tests on Natural 
Clay Shale 
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The "residual" friction angle was estimated simply by 
trimming a smooth failure surface in a direct shear sample 
and shearing the sample back and forth several times on 
that surface. Only the final stress path curves are shown in 
Fig. 3. 
The estimated value of c was 100 psf (4.8 kPa) for peak 
and residual, but. was about 25 deg. for peak and 16 deg. 
for residual conditions (Fig. 3). The measured shearing 
properties agreed well with a number of other sheari~g 
tests performed in our laboratory on samples from thts 
formation, or from other similar formations in the area, 
except that the peak friction angle for the other tests was 
usually closer to 21 deg. and the residual friction angle 
generally was in the range of 12 to 15 degrees. 
ANALYSIS OF STABILITY 
The estimated wall configuration in the area of the failure 
is shown in Fig. 1. The location of the contact between fill 
and natural soil is uncertain. The actual location of the 
bottom of the lower wall is unknown because design 
drawings indicated that the elevation of that base slab would 
be decided in the field. It is probable that the slab in the 
middle part of the failed zone was on natural soil because 
that was the apparent intent of the specifications, but it may 
also have been on fill. 
The uncertainties in wall geometries and soil conditions 
are such that a sophisticated analysis is not warranted. 
Instead, the analysis is of the type that a practicing engineer 
might have made during the design phase. The purpose of 
the analysis is to determine if a relatively routine approach, 
properly applied, would have predicted failure. 
The analysis was performed in two phases. In the first, 
the upper wall and soil below it (Fig. 4) were taken out as a 
free body. Equations for force equilibrium in the vertical 
and horizontal direction make it possible to calculate the 
force P that this upper wall and associated soil applies to the 
vertical plane through the heel of the lower wall. The 
orientation of the potential shear surface (9 in Fig. 4) was 
obtained by trial. Because of the tedious nature of the 
computations, a computer program was written that 
allowed the user to vary the parameters (~, c, ~. Hw, q, o, 
"(, and W) as required. 
In the second phase, the force P was applied to a free 
body composed of the lower wall and soil above its heel 
slab (Fig. 5) and factors of safety were calculated for 
various failure modes. 
The analysis was of the Coulomb type and thus moment 
equilibrium was not satisfied. However, for active 
conditions, the Coulomb analysis seems to yield forces that 
are comparable to those calculated using more sophisticated 
approaches (Morgenstern and Eisenstein, 1970). The 
location of P and its obliquity were unknown. Trial 






Assumed Wedge of Soil Sliding Toward the 
Lower Wall 
Assumed Conditions for the Lower Wall 
Analyses to Obtain P 
I 
Assume the soil is saturated and undrained. Practicin 
engineers often assume that clays are saturated an 
undrained because then they can assume that <1>=0 and th 
analysis is greatly simplified. The presence of gravellayex 
in the backfill, with water flowing through them, makes : 
clear that this condition could not have existed throughot 
the backfill. However, the designer performed som 
computations based on this assumption so it will be use 
here as one extreme case. In any case, the wall did stan 
for some period of time and that stability needs to b 
explained. 
Analyses using 0=0 (Fig. 4) indicated that P droppe, 
from 39 kips/foot when c=lOO psf (4.8 kPa), to 0 whe: 
c=720 psf (34 kPa). Measured undrained strengths were i.J 
excess of 720 psf (34 kPa) for the natural soils an, 
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estimated undrained strengths for the exposed clay layers in 
the backfill also exceeded 720 psf (34 kPa). The analysis 
confirms the field observation that a substantial height of 
the clayey part of the fill would stand unsupported as long 
as it was undrained. The assumption of no drainage could 
not apply to the fill prior to failure, because of the gravel 
layers, but it may be relevant for the cohesive parts of the 
backfill immediately after failure. 
Assume the soil is fully drained. Because of the 
variation in fill material both vertically and horizontally, it 
seemed most reasonable to assume a homogeneous fill but 
do a sensitivity analysis for a reasonable range in 
properties. The cohesionless layers probably had friction 
angles of at least 35 degrees, and no cohesion. The clay 
layers probably had friction angles close to that of the 
natural soil, 25 degrees, with no cohesion. The results of 
part of the sensitivity study are shown in Table 2. 









































The effect of depth of water (Hw) and obliquity of the 
resulting earth force (o) are minor compared with the 
effects of mean c and lj>. It would appear that a reasonably 
conservative design would use about 15 kips/foot for P. 
Local Stability of the Lower Wall 
Stability of the lower wall (Fig. 5) was analyzed for 
overturning, sliding, and bearing capacity. Equations for 
overturning and sliding are found in most books on 
foundation engineering and need not be repeated. 
Some engineers, including the designer of this wall, ~o 
not calculate bearing capacity l;>ut rather calculate the tlp 
stress assuming a linear variation in contact stress across the 
base. Such a computation makes little sense fo~ a surf~ce 
footing on a cohesionless subsoil because the tl~ be~nng 
capacity depends on footing width and has the _mat10~al 
value of zero for an imaginary strip footing of differential 
width at the toe. The more rational approach is to 
calculate the bearing capacity of the base slab. The bearing 
capacity of a strip footing subjected to an inclined ~d 
eccentric load, and located on a sloping ground surface, 1s 
given by: 
pf = cNcdcicgc + yDfNqdqiqgq + 0.5B'yN-ydyiygy (1) 
where N is a dimensionless bearing capacity factor (depends 
on lj> ), d, i, and g are dimensionless factors to account for 
footing depth, inclined load, and effects of local ground 
slope, c is soil cohesion, y is the soil unit weight above 
footing depth (q term) or below footing depth (y term). 
The bearing capacity, pf, is the vertical component of the 
applied force, divided by footing width. A variety of 
equations have been proposed for the various factors. 
Equations used here were as follows: 
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Nc = (Nq-1)cot(lj>) (Prandtl, 1920_, 1921) (2) 
Nq = exp(1t tan lj>) tan2(45+!) (Reissner, 1924) (3) 
Ny= (Nq-l)tan(1.41j>) 
D 


















where a. is the inclination of the resultant force on the base 
relative to a line normal to the plane of the base, 
iy = (1 - ~)2 





where ~ is the slope of the ground surface measured 
positively downwards from the horizontal (degrees) 
gq = gy = [1 - 0.5 tan(~)]5 (Hansen, 1970) (12) 
B' = B-2e (Meyerhof, 1953) (13) 
and e is the eccentricity of the resultant force applied to the 
subsoil by the base. 
Analyses were performed to determine the factors of 
safety against failure of the lower wall. A sensitivity study 
was again performed because of the uncertainties in the 
various input variables. The results of a part of those 
computations are shown in Table 3. For all analyses, it 
was assumed that there was 1.3 feet (0.4 m) of soil 
producing passive resistance at the toe. 
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Table 3 Sensitivity Study for the Lower Wall 
p H op 0 aB ~ c 
kp p de B ps de ps Fsbc Fso Fss 
f ft g. de f g. f 
15 5 0 25 0 25 10 0.08 1.13 0.47 
13 0 0.19 1.31 0.55 
11 0.31 1.55 0.65 
15 3 0 25 0 25 10 0.49 1.89 0.47 
5 0 0.08 1.31 0.47 
6 0.00 -.-- -.--
15 5 0 25 0 25 10 0.08 1.13 0.47 
15 0 0.33 2.35 0.61 
15 5 0 30 0 30 10 0.12 1.13 0.58 
25 25 0 0.08 1.13 0.47 
15 5 0 25 0 25 10 0.08 1.13 0.47 
0 0.03 1.13 0.46 
0 
15 5 0 0 10 0 10 0.16 1.13 0.76 
00 00 
The first group of three analyses with variable force P 
shows that the lower wall was unstable in bearing capacity 
and sliding modes for any reasonable forces that would be 
predicted from the previous analyses. 
The second set of analyses show that even a small 
increase in the assumed height of application of force would 
result in a bearing capacity failure because of the resulting 
eccentricity of resultant force on the base. 
The third set of analyses shows that increasing the 
assumed obliquity of the applied force (positive for a 
downwards vertical component) results in an increase in the 
factors of safety, mostly because the horizontal component 
of the force is then reduced. 
The fourth set of analyses shows that increasing the 
friction angles in the reasonable range had only a small 
numerical influence on the factors of safety. 
Similarly, the sixth set of analyses showed that changing 
the cohesion, through a reasonable range, also had a small 
effect on the factors of safety. 
The fmal analysis was for the undrained case and used 
the smallest measured strengths. In that case the wall was 
unstable for bearing capacity. The largest measured 
strengths were required to bring the bearing capacity factor 
of safety up to 1.0. These analyses utilized the value of P 
corresponding to a drained condition of the backfill. 
Previous analyses showed that under undrained condition 
there would be essentially no applied force and the wall 
would then clearly be stable. 
Overall Stability 
Overall stability analyses were performed using a slope 
stability program but the value of those analyses was 
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limited by the uncertainties in soil properties once the clay 
shale became relatively hard. If the clay shale was assumed 
to possess a large effective cohesion at shallow depth, then 
the slope stability analysis gave factors of safety comparable 
to those obtained for bearing capacity and sliding. 
CAUSES OF THE INADEQUATE DESIGN 
The designer's computations were examined as part of the 
discovery phase prior to trial. In general, the main source 
of the problem was that the designer based the design on a 
standard engineering handbook without understanding the 
limitations of such an approach. On a more technical level: 
1. the designer followed the common, but irrational, 
practice of limiting the apparent tip stress rather than 
estimating the bearing capacity of the base slab. The 
bearing capacity equations for cases involving inclined 
and eccentric load, and for footings on a slope, have a 
substantial degree of uncertainty in them but at least they 
provide a rational form of analysis. 
2. the designer apparently did not understand the 
difference between the strengths of the soil under 
drained and undrained conditions. 
3. for reasons that were never explained, the designer 
ignored the effect of the upper wall on the loads applied 
to the lower wall. 
WHY DID THE WALL STAND UP AT ALL? 
Based on the low calculated factors of safety, one wonders 
why the wall stood up at all. Some of the reasons include: 
1. The maximum height of wall existed over a length of 
only about one-hundred feet (30 m). Stability increases 
rapidly as the wall height decreases so only a small 
portion of the wall was in danger. The unstable sectio11 
of the wall probably derived limited amounts of suppor1 
from adjacent stable portions. 
2. Subsoil conditions were uncertain. Some of the wall 
may have been supported by a thin layer of limestone 
that was above the clay shale. 
3. The clay shale became considerably harder with deptl: 
(could not be penetrated with thin-walled steel tubes' 
and may have been cemented, thus causing the factor o; 
safety for bearing capacity to be higher than predicted. 
4. Negative pore. water pressures in the backfill durin!! 
much of xts hfe would have reduced applied force! 
greatly, perhaps essentially to zero. The rains tha 
immediately preceded the failure apparently raised the 
pore water pressures in the fill and caused increase( 
earth forces. 
5. The drainage system, though widely used, wa1 
ineffective and large water pressures apparently built UJ 
on the wall after the rain. Because of the irregula 
nature of the fill, the water pressure was probably no 
hydrostatic but, instead, developed in the more perviou: 
layers of fill. 
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CONCLUSIONS (RE)LEARNED 
This case history demonstrates lessons that are generally 
taught in college but seem often forgotten in practice, 
including: 
1. Engineers should not practice outside of their areas of 
training and experience. 
2. Engineers must resist pressure from clients who want 
designs turned out immediately because of economic 
considerations. A careless design, made in haste, may 
cost the engineer dearly. 
3. Design recommendations made in standard civil 
engineering handbooks, for geotechnical problems, often 
over simplify the problems and do not provide the kind 
of technical advice that is required for successful design. 
4. Designers should consider both short term (undrained) 
and long term (drained) conditions unless a technical 
understanding of the problem makes it clear that one or 
the other is the critical case. 
5. Positive means of controlling water pressures on walls is 
critical. 
LIST OF VARIABLES 
aB adhesion of base slab on subsoil 
c cohesion 
Fsbc factor of safety against a bearing capacity failure 
Fso factor of safety against an overturning failure 
Fss factor of safety against a sliding failure 
Hp vertical distance from the heel to the point of 
application of the earth force 
Hw height of ponded water 
P force applied to the vertical plane through the heel of 
the lower wall (force/length) 
8 obliquity of resultant force P (degrees) 
Op obliquity of P on the vertical plane through the heel 
(degrees) 
OB obliquity of resultant force applied to the subsoil by 
the base of the lower wall (degrees) 
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